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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 In this appeal, we must decide whether the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)1 preempts a 
                     
1.  Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, & 42 U.S.C.). 
 
 
Pennsylvania minimum wage law applying to public works projects.  
We hold that such a law may not refer to ERISA plans or accord 
them special treatment, but may set minimum wages and give 
employers the option of satisfying a portion of the wage through 
contributions for employee benefits.   
 An employer, an employers' association, and a labor 
union2 sued Pennsylvania's Secretary of Labor and Industry and 
the members of the state Prevailing Wage Appeals Board 
(collectively, the Secretary) in federal district court, claiming 
Pennsylvania's Prevailing Wage Act (the Act),3 its accompanying 
regulations, and an administrative Declaratory Order interpreting 
the Act are preempted by ERISA.  The district court agreed and 
overturned the Act, regulations, and order.  The Secretary of 
Labor and Industry appeals, and the employers' association cross-
appeals. 
 We agree the Declaratory Order implements the Act in a 
manner preempted by ERISA.  But we find the Act and its 
regulations are not preempted because they confer broad authority 
that may be implemented in a manner consistent with ERISA.  
Therefore we will affirm the judgment of the district court 
striking the Declaratory Order, but reverse its judgment striking 
the Act and accompanying regulations. 
                     
2.  These were, respectively, the Bell Telephone Company of 
Pennsylvania, Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders and 
Contractors, Inc., and the Communications Workers of America, 
AFL-CIO, District 13.. 




 A.  The Prevailing Wage Act 
 The purpose of the Prevailing Wage Act "is to protect 
workers employed on public projects from substandard wages by 
insuring that they receive the prevailing minimum wage."  
Lycoming County Nursing Home v. Pennsylvania, 627 A.2d 238, 242 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).  The statute provides, "Not less than the 
prevailing minimum wages as determined hereunder shall be paid to 
all workmen on public work," 43 P.S.A. § 165-5, and sets forth 
general rules for determining prevailing minimum wages.  Before 
public contracts are put out to bid, the Secretary of Labor and 
Industry, in consultation with an Advisory Board, determines the 
prevailing minimum wage for each locality and for each "craft or 
classification" of worker to be employed.  43 P.S.A. § 165-7.  In 
making this determination, "employer and employe contributions 
for employe benefits pursuant to a bona fide collective 
bargaining agreement shall be considered an integral part of the 
wage rate."  Id.  The statute does not define "prevailing minimum 
wage rate," nor specify how contributions for benefits are to be 
integrated into the wage rate.4 
 The seven-member Prevailing Wage Appeals Board hears 
"any grievance or appeal arising out of the administration of 
                     
4.  Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Court has held that despite the 
lack of definition the terms "prevailing minimum wage rate" and 
"craft or classification" are "adequate primary standards to 
guide the Secretary in the exercise of his duties under [§ 165-
7]," so that the statute does not assign the Secretary 
"unacceptably excessive discretion."  Pennsylvania v. Altemose 
Construction Co., 368 A.2d 875, 881 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 1977). 
 
 
this act" "[p]romulgate[s] rules and regulations necessary to 
carry out [its] duties."  43 P.S.A. § 165-2.2(e).  Contractors 
and subcontractors must "keep an accurate record showing the 
name, craft and the actual hourly rate of wage paid to each 
workman employed by him in connection with public work" for two 
years following payment, subject to inspection by the Secretary 
and the public body awarding the contract.  Id. § 165-6. 
 B.  The Accompanying Regulations 
 The Pennsylvania Code, Title 34 §§ 9.101-9.112, 
provides additional rules for calculating and enforcing the 
prevailing minimum wage in public works contracts.  The 
regulations make clear that a prevailing minimum wage will state 
a cash wage and a level of benefits contributions as separate 
components.  Contractors and subcontractors must pay "[n]ot less 
than the general prevailing minimum wage rates determined by the 
Secretary." If a contract does not provide for employee benefits 
contributions "which the Secretary has determined to be included 
in the general prevailing minimum wage rate," the employer may 
pay "the monetary equivalent thereof."  Id. § 9.106.   
 Contributions for employee benefits are defined as 
"`[f]ringe benefits' paid or to be paid, including payment made 
whether directly or indirectly, to the workmen for sick, 
disability, death, other than Workmen's Compensation, medical, 
surgical, hospital, vacation, travel expense, retirement and 
pension benefits."  Id. § 9.102.  Contractors may pay their 
workers above the prevailing rate.  Id.   
 
 
 To determine the prevailing minimum wages and benefits 
in a locality, the Secretary considers local collective 
bargaining agreements between established bargaining 
representatives and employers and other information.  Id. § 
9.105.  The regulations specify additional records and reporting 
requirements for employers.  Id. §§ 9.109, 9.110.  The Secretary 
may investigate and hold hearings on allegations of underpayment, 
and may bar public contracts with a violating firm and request 
the Attorney General to recover penalties.  Id. § 9.111. 
 C.  The April 13, 1992 Declaratory Order 
 Although the Act and regulations specify the prevailing 
minimum wage will have separate cash and benefits components, 
they do not state whether the benefits component should merely 
state the total level of benefits contributions an employer must 
make (through benefits contributions or their cash equivalent), 
or whether it should specify which types and levels of benefits 
must be given.  That issue has been resolved by the Secretary and 
Board in different ways at different times.  
  For several years prior to April 13, 1992, the 
Secretary used a "line-item" approach in determining compliance 
with a prevailing wage's benefits component.5  The Secretary made 
                     
5.  The Department apparently officially adopted the line-item 
approach in 1988.  In its brief to the Prevailing Wage Appeals 
Board, the Prevailing Wage Division of the Department of Labor 
and Industry cites as its earliest authority for the line-item 
approach a 1988 decision of the Secretary, In re:  Francesco 
Scrivofilo, t/d/b/a Franco Elec. Co., Determination of the 
Secretary (Dec. 1, 1988).  Bell and the Communications Workers of 
America claim their wage and benefits packages were not reviewed 




a "predetermination" of the prevailing wage for each category of 
worker in a given locality, specifying the prevailing levels of 
benefits in a number of categories, such as "health-and-welfare," 
"pension," and "apprenticeship-and-training".  An employer had to 
meet the prevailing level of each category of benefit, or pay the 
shortfall in cash to the worker.  An employer was not given 
credit toward the benefits component for benefits provided in a 
given category in excess of that required in the 
predetermination, nor for any benefits paid in a category not 
included in the predetermination.  Thus, in addition to paying 
the prevailing cash wage, an employer was required either to make 
benefits contributions in the specified categories and amounts or 
to pay cash to the extent its benefits contributions fell short 
in any specified category.6 
 On November 28, 1990, counsel for Keystone Chapter, 
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., a construction 
industry employers' association wrote to the Secretary, 
                     
6.  For example, a prevailing minimum wage predetermination for a 
particular classification of worker on a public works project 
might be $7 cash, $2 pension, and $1 health-and-welfare, per 
hour.  An employer could pay as specified in the predetermination 
-- $7 per hour cash, $2 pension, and $1 health-and-welfare -- or 
substitute cash for some or all of the prevailing benefits -- for 
example, $8 cash, $1 pension, and $1 health-and-welfare, or $10 
cash and no benefits.  However, an employer paying $7 cash, $2 
pension, and $1 for apprenticeship-and-training would not satisfy 
the minimum, because it had neither contributed $1 for health-
and-welfare nor replaced it with $1 cash.  Similarly, an employer 
paying $7 cash and $3 pension would not be in compliance -- 
notwithstanding the extra dollar in the pension category; it too 
would be required either to pay $1 health-and-welfare or replace 
that contribution with $1 cash. 
 
 
complaining about the line-item approach.  The complaint was 
referred to the Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, which treated it 
as a "Petition for Declaratory Order" and heard oral argument.  
Bell Telephone Co., an employer that performs public work, also 
participated in the proceeding.  The petitioners argued that the 
line-item approach was not the best interpretation of the 
Prevailing Wage Act, that it was unfair to non-union and non-
local contractors, and that it was preempted by ERISA.  The 
Prevailing Wage Division of the Department of Labor and Industry 
(the Division) conceded that the Prevailing Wage Act did not 
require line-item specification of fringe benefits, but stated 
that as remedial legislation it should be interpreted broadly in 
favor of the protected class.7 
 On April 13, 1992, apparently in response to the 
petitioners' ERISA preemption arguments, the Prevailing Wage 
Appeals Board issued a Declaratory Order modifying the 
implementation of the Prevailing Wage Act.  The Board stated it 
"should interpret state law so that it comports with 
constitutional and federal law," Keystone App. at 71, and 
established a special bona fide status for contributions for 
ERISA benefits.  It ordered: 
  2.  That the [Prevailing Wage] Division 
must determine, in the first instance, 
whether or not a contribution for employee 
benefits is bona fide; 
                     
7.  John T. Kupchinsky, attorney for the Division, stated, "If 
you're going to fudge things, you fudge things to get more people 
covered by the act . . . ."  Transcript of Oral Argument before 




  3.  That a contribution is bona fide if 
that contribution:  (a) is made to an 
"employee benefit plan" or fund or program 
subject to the [ERISA]; (b) has been 
determined to be bona fide by the Division; 
and (c) is not required by federal, state or 
local law; 
 . . . . 
Keystone App. at 73-74. 
 
 The next part of the order, paragraph 4, appears to 
abolish the line-item system, although it is not clear if this 
applies only to the ERISA benefit contributions discussed in 
paragraph 3, or to all benefits.  It provides:   
  4.  That credit for contributions for 
employee benefits, up to the maximum 
established by the predetermination, shall be 
given as follows: 
 . . . 
 c)  Credit shall be given for contributions 
in each predetermined category up to the 
predetermined rate for each category; 
 d)  Contributions which exceed the 
predetermined rate in any employee benefit 
category shall be credited in any other 
predetermined benefit category (or 
categories) for which the predetermined rate 
has not been satisfied; 
 e)  Credit shall be given for contributions 
for employee benefits not included in the 
predetermined benefit categories; 
 f)  The maximum credit for contributions for 
employee benefits shall not exceed the total 
amount of contributions for employee benefits 
established by predetermination; 
 . . . . 
Keystone App. at 74-75. 
 
 As interpreted by the Prevailing Wage Division, the 
Declaratory Order establishes that any contribution to an ERISA 
plan is per se bona fide, while other benefits contributions must 
be certified by the Division as such.  Furthermore, ERISA 
 
 
benefits contributions are counted toward the benefits minimum no 
matter what category they fall in, while the line-item approach 
is maintained for non-ERISA benefits contributions.  Letter from 
Susan J. Forney, Senior Deputy Attorney General, to the Court, 
(April 18, 1994).8  We accept this reading of the Declaratory 
Order as a reasonable interpretation.9 
 D.  Litigation 
 Keystone filed a complaint in United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking injunctive 
relief against the Secretary.  Keystone claimed the Prevailing 
Wage Act was preempted by ERISA because it prevented employers 
from setting the terms of their benefits plans.  Bell Telephone 
                     
8.  A May 29, 1992 memo from Field Inspection Supervisor A. 
Robert Risaliti to the Field Inspectors, who enforce the 
Prevailing Wage Act, confirms that the Declaratory Order has been 
thus implemented.  It states that neither the Division nor the 
inspector is authorized to object to the presumed bona fide 
status of ERISA contributions, whether or not the contributions 
match the categories in the predetermination.  The memo also 
indicates the line-item approach is still applied to non-ERISA 
benefits. 
 Ms. Forney's letter came as a correction to the 
Secretary's position at oral argument, that pursuant to the April 
13 Order the line-item approach was abandoned for all benefits, 
and that any non-ERISA benefit contributions are credited against 
the benefit contribution rate if they were judged by the Division 
to be bona fide.  See Brief for Appellants at 10-11.   
 
9.  The Appellees differ in their interpretation of the order.  
Keystone essentially agrees with the Secretary's interpretation.  
Bell and the CWA contend that only contributions to ERISA benefit 
plans now count towards the fringe benefit component; other 
benefits, they say, will not be credited at all.  Although the 
order is somewhat unclear, we find it implausible that the Board 
would disqualify all non-ERISA benefits contributions from 
counting toward the prevailing minimum, as this would be a major 
departure from past practice without grounding in the Act. 
 
 
and its employees' union, the Communications Workers of America 
(CWA), brought a suit against the Secretary and the members of 
the Prevailing Wage Appeals Board seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the Prevailing Wage Act was preempted by ERISA or by the 
NLRA.10  They claimed their participation in public works 
projects was impeded because their collective bargaining 
agreements, which include centrally administered benefits plans 
for workers in several states, would not qualify as meeting the 
prevailing wage.  Some of these contracts included non-ERISA 
benefit contributions that they believed would not be credited 
toward the benefits component, and some contracts gave benefits 
in excess of the prevailing benefits minimum that would not be 
credited against the cash wage component.  Keystone, Bell, the 
CWA, and the defendants moved for summary judgment. 
 On July 30, 1993, the district court declared the 
Prevailing Wage Act, its accompanying regulations, and the 
Declaratory Order preempted by § 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 
1144(a) (1988), which preempts state law relating to ERISA plans.  
The court found (1) the Declaratory Order specifically referred 
to ERISA plans, (2) the Prevailing Wage Act could affect the 
level of benefits paid to employees by discouraging benefits in 
excess of the prevailing rate, and (3) the Act imposed 
administrative burdens on ERISA plans by requiring employers to 
keep records of wages and benefits.  The court declined the 
Secretary's request to sever the portion of the Act covering 
                     
10.  The latter claim was dismissed and is not raised on appeal.   
 
 
fringe benefits and leave standing a requirement that government 
contractors simply meet the prevailing cash wage because it 
believed such a system would be contrary to legislative intent. 
 On appeal, the Secretary argues the district court 
erred in finding the Prevailing Wage Act, its regulations, and 
the Declaratory Order preempted.  Alternatively, he requests that 
if the Act's integration of benefits into the prevailing wage 
violates ERISA, we sever that portion and allow the Act to stand 
to the extent it regulates cash wages.  Keystone and Bell ask us 
to affirm the district court.  Keystone also cross-appeals, 
requesting that if we do not affirm the district court, we enjoin 
the Secretary from specifying line-item requirements for ERISA 
benefit contributions.  The CWA requests that only the 
Declaratory Order be invalidated, claiming the law itself can be 
interpreted in a manner that is not preempted. 
 The district court had jurisdiction of these ERISA 
preemption claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).  "A plaintiff 
who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground 
that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by 
virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, 
thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve."  Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14.11 
                     
11.  Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, in its amicus brief, 
argues that New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. New Jersey, 747 F.2d 891 
(3d Cir. 1984), bars federal question jurisdiction.  While we 
held there that a district court lacked jurisdiction of a labor 
union's action for declaratory judgment that ERISA preempted four 
New Jersey statutes, our holding simply rejected the union's 
 
 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
and our review of a summary judgment is plenary, Public Interest 
Research v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).  "[T]he appellate 
court is required to apply the same test the district court 
should have utilized initially.  Inferences to be drawn from the 
underlying facts contained in the evidential sources submitted to 
the trial court must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion."  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 
F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).  
The district court's conclusions of law are subject to plenary 
review.  Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1370 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990).   
 II. 
 A.  ERISA 
 ERISA provides uniform federal regulation of employee 
benefit plans.  It is a comprehensive statute that protects the 
interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee 
benefit plans, and promotes administrative efficiency through 
exclusive federal regulation of such plans.  ERISA subjects 
(..continued) 
attempt to sue under ERISA's jurisdictional provision, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) & (e)(1), which grants federal jurisdiction of 
civil actions only by participants and beneficiaries.  New Jersey 
State AFL-CIO, 747 F.2d at 892-93.  As we explained in Northeast 
Dept. ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 
229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 153 n.3 (3d Cir. 1985), "[t]he 
matter of federal question jurisdiction was not raised by the 
parties in AFL-CIO, nor was it considered by the panel."  Shaw, 
as quoted above, makes clear that there is federal question 
jurisdiction where a party claims it will be subject to state 
regulation preempted by ERISA. 
 
 
employee benefit plans to participation, funding, and vesting 
requirements, and to uniform standards on matters like reporting, 
disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility.  Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90-
91. 
 Section 514(a) of ERISA promotes uniform regulation of 
employee benefits plans, by preempting, with limited exceptions 
not applicable here, "any and all State laws insofar as they may 
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by 
ERISA.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  ERISA covers pension benefit plans 
and plans for welfare benefits such as medical benefits, training 
programs, and daycare centers.12  29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988).  
Typically, these plans create a need for "an ongoing 
administrative program for processing claims and paying 
benefits."  Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12 
(1987). 
                     
12.  The statute defines "employee benefit plan" as an "employee 
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a 
plan which is both."  29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).  An employee welfare 
benefit plan is any "plan, fund, or program . . . established or 
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by 
both" to provide "(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or 
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, 
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, 
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, 
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit 
described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on 
retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions)."  
Id. § 1002(1).  29 U.S.C. § 186(c) involves union welfare funds 
for benefits such as vacation benefits, scholarships, and housing 
assistance.  An employee pension benefit plan is "any plan, fund, 
or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or by 
an employee organization, or by both . . . [that] (i) provides 
retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of 
income by employees for periods extending to the termination of 
covered employment or beyond . . . ." Id. § 1002(2)(a). 
 
 
 In determining the scope of § 514(a), "as in any pre-
emption analysis, `[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone.'"   Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 
U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 
U.S. 497, 504 (1978)) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Recognizing the complex 
administrative task faced by employers maintaining employee 
benefit plans, Congress enacted § 514(a) to ensure that plan 
administration is subject to a single set of regulations rather 
than a "patchwork scheme."  Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 11. 
 We summarized the standards for ERISA preemption in 
United Wire v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382, 383 (1993):  
  The preemption clause of ERISA is 
notable for its breadth, and manifests 
Congress's intention to establish pension 
plan regulation as an exclusively federal 
concern.  Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 68 
L.Ed.2d 402 (1981).  The Supreme Court has 
noted that a state law "relates to" an ERISA 
governed plan, within the meaning of § 
514(a)'s preemptive reach, "if it has a 
connection with or reference to such a plan."  
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97, 103 
S.Ct. 2890, 2900, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983).  The 
Court in Shaw noted, however, that "[s]ome 
state actions may affect employee benefit 
plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a 
manner to warrant a finding that the law 
`relates to' the plan."   463 U.S. at 100, n. 
21, 103 S.Ct. at 2901 n. 21. 
 
Id. at 1191.  We then set out guidelines for determining if a law 
related, directly or indirectly, to ERISA plans: 
  A rule of law relates to an ERISA plan 
if it is specifically designed to affect 
 
 
employee benefit plans, if it singles out 
such plans for special treatment, or if the 
rights or restrictions it creates are 
predicated on the existence of such a plan.  
. . .  
  This does not end our inquiry, however.  
A state rule of law may be preempted even 
though it has no such direct nexus with ERISA 
plans if its effect is to dictate or restrict 
the choices of ERISA plans with regard to 
their benefits, structure, reporting and 
administration, or if allowing states to have 
such rules would impair the ability of a plan 
to function simultaneously in a number of 
states.  
 
Id. at 1192-93 (footnotes omitted).  We will apply this analytic 
framework to the Declaratory Order, the Prevailing Wage Act, and 
its accompanying regulations. 
 B.  The Declaratory Order 
 The District Court correctly held that ERISA preempts 
the Declaratory Order, because it "singles out [ERISA] plans for 
special treatment."13  United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.  Under the 
Order, the Prevailing Wage Division treats contributions for 
ERISA benefits as per se bona fide, but must approve other 
contributions.  Further, any ERISA benefits contributions count 
toward the benefits minimum, while non-ERISA benefits only count 
if they are in one of the benefit categories listed in the 
predetermination. 
                     
13.  The Declaratory Order is "State law" subject to ERISA 
preemption under § 514, for "State law" includes not only 
statutes, but "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other 
State action having the effect of law, of any State."  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(c)(1).  See National Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 
F.2d 1555 (10th Cir.) (invalidating ruling of Commissioner of 
Oklahoma Department of Labor under state's prevailing wage act as 
preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 406 (1992). 
 
 
 Such special treatment for ERISA plans is grounds for 
preemption.  In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 
U.S. 825 (1988), the Supreme Court struck down a provision of a 
Georgia statute that barred garnishment of ERISA plan funds.  
Because the provision expressly referred to ERISA benefit plans 
and accorded them special treatment, the Court found it "related 
to" such plans within the meaning of § 514(a).  Id. at 829-30.  
Though the law might have been enacted to further ERISA's 
purposes, the Court said, "[l]egislative `good intentions' do not 
save a state law within the broad pre-emptive scope of § 541(a)."  
Id. at 830.  See also McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 950 
F.2d 13, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1991) (§ 514(a) preempts mechanics' lien 
law expressly inuring lien to advantage of various types of ERISA 
plans), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1939 (1992). 
 Here, too, there may have been "good intentions" behind 
the special treatment given to ERISA plans.  The Prevailing Wage 
Appeals Board was responding to a claim that the Prevailing Wage 
Act was preempted by ERISA, and stated its intention to 
"interpret state law so that it comports with constitutional and 
federal law."  Declaratory Order at 2.  Despite this effort, the 
Board interpreted the Prevailing Wage Act in a way that is 
preempted by ERISA.14 
                     
14.  Amicus Curiae, the Roofing Contractors Association, argues 
that preemption should not apply to state actions where the state 
is acting as a proprietor.  Because we find the Prevailing Wage 
Act and its accompanying regulations not preempted on other 
grounds, this argument could only affect our decision regarding 
the Declaratory Order.  The Association relies on Building & 
Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Bldrs. and Contractors, 113 
S. Ct. 1190 (1993), in which the Supreme Court held a bid 
 
 
 C.  The Act and its accompanying regulations 
 Although the Declaratory Order implemented the 
Prevailing Wage Act in a manner preempted by ERISA, we hold that 
neither the Prevailing Wage Act nor its accompanying regulations 
are preempted.  Under at least one reasonable interpretation of 
the Act and regulations, an interpretation the Agency is free to 
adopt, the Act and regulations merely require that the Secretary 
set a prevailing wage that consists of a cash component and may 
include a benefits component.  Employers must pay the cash 
(..continued) 
specification by a Massachusetts state authority, requiring 
bidders to abide by a particular labor agreement, was not 
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, despite the 
argument that the bid specification was a state intrusion into 
labor-management relations, a regulatory realm preempted by the 
federal government under the NLRA. 
 The Supreme Court rejected the preemption claim because 
the state was acting "as a market participant with no interest in 
setting policy," rather than in "a role that is 
characteristically governmental."  Id. at 1197.  The Court 
explained that when a state acts in the market place as an owner 
and manager of property, it "is not subject to pre-emption by the 
NLRA, because pre-emption doctrines apply only to state 
regulation."  Id. at 1196. 
 Were we to reach the merits of this novel argument, we 
would have to begin by considering the differences between 
preemption under the NLRA, which has no explicit preemption 
provision, and preemption under ERISA, whose preemption clause is 
expansive.  We need not pursue the inquiry, however, because the 
theory could not apply here in any event.  In applying the 
Prevailing Wage Act, Pennsylvania is clearly acting with an 
"interest in setting policy," not as a proprietor.  Id. at 1197.  
The Prevailing Wage Act aims to ensure that workers receive 
adequate wages, a governmental objective.  Throughout its brief, 
the state justifies its action in terms of its "right to 
establish labor standards," which it calls a "traditional police 
power."  Brief for the Appellants at 14-15.  It would be 
difficult for the state to claim it is acting as a private market 




component of the wage in cash, but they may pay the benefits 
component either in benefits or cash.  Any benefits they provide, 
regardless of type, would count toward the benefits component.15  
Under this interpretation, the Prevailing Wage Act and the 
regulations do not control benefits, but rather require certain 
wages to be paid.   
  The Act and regulations thus fall into the field 
of state regulation of wages, which is one of those "areas of 
traditional state regulation"  that we "must presume that 
Congress did not intend to pre-empt."  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985).  That presumption is 
rebuttable, however, for "to avoid being preempted, a state law 
in addition to being an exercise of traditional police powers 
must also affect the plan `in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a 
manner to warrant a finding that the law "relates to" the plan.'"  
Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 
1985) (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 
                     
15.  We read the Prevailing Wage Act as a statute that may 
properly be implemented in a number of ways, so that in 
overturning the Declaratory Order we need not invalidate the 
Prevailing Wage Act itself or its regulations.  We see nothing in 
the Act or the regulations requiring that the benefits component 
specify particular types of benefits and the amounts to be 
contributed in each.  The variety of official interpretations 
given the Prevailing Wage Act at different times shows that the 
Secretary and the Prevailing Wage Appeals Board also believe 
line-item specification of benefits is but one of the approaches 
at their disposal under the Act.  See supra, note Error! Bookmark 
not defined..   
 There may be other interpretations of the statute that 
are not preempted.  Because there is one such reasonable 




(1986).  Nevertheless, the state law at issue here avoids 
preemption because it does not impede the goals of ERISA and has 
only incidental and insignificant relations to ERISA plans. 
  1.  Direct relation 
 The Prevailing Wage Act and regulations lack any of the 
three types of direct relations to ERISA plans described in 
United Wire.  See supra at 20.  The Act and regulations are not 
"specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans."  United 
Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.  The Act aims to protect workers on 
public projects from substandard pay by requiring a minimum cash 
wage that may be supplemented by either prevailing benefits or 
their cash equivalent.  Neither the Act nor its regulations 
require that certain benefits plans be established, that certain 
benefits be given, or that ERISA plans be administered in a 
certain way. 
 The Act and regulations do not "single[] out [ERISA] 
plans for special treatment," or even refer to such plans.  
United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.  Rather, they merely refer to 
employee benefits, with no distinction between ERISA and non-
ERISA benefits.  The Supreme Court has rejected the argument 
"that ERISA forecloses virtually all state legislation regarding 
employee benefits," and instead directs us to inquire whether the 
state law "relates to" ERISA benefit plans.  Fort Halifax, 482 
U.S. at 7.  While some of the benefits the Secretary is permitted 
to count in calculating the prevailing wage will come from ERISA 
 
 
plans,16 we do not believe ERISA requires a state to ignore the 
existence of ERISA benefits when considering overall remuneration 
to workers.  The Court has allowed the inclusion or implication 
of ERISA plans in generally valid state legislation.  See, e.g., 
Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830-841 (approving garnishment law that would 
apply to ERISA plan benefits as well as other assets of debtors); 
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 106-08 (approving disability benefits 
requirements that could be satisfied through ERISA plans).   
Indeed, Mackey suggests that a law would be preempted if it 
counted all remuneration to workers except benefits from ERISA 
plans, for this would be special treatment.   
 Finally, although ERISA plans are within the scope of 
the regulator's consideration under the Prevailing Wage Act, the 
Act does not create a legislative scheme in which an ERISA plan 
is so central that "the rights or restrictions [the law] creates 
are predicated on the existence of such a plan."  United Wire, 
995 F.2d at 1192.  An example of a law predicated on ERISA plans 
                     
16.  Indeed, one regulation gives examples of employee benefits 
that include benefits which would come from ERISA plans, such as 
"retirement and pension benefits."  34 Pa. Code § 9.102.  While 
the Supreme Court has held a statute's reference to ERISA plans 
grounds for preemption, District of Columbia v. Greater 
Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992), as discussed 
below, that statute referred only to the ERISA plan as the basis 
for the rights it accorded.  But the listing of an ERISA plan 
benefit as an example of the factors to be calculated into a 
broader determination, such as a prevailing wage, is in and of 
itself inconsequential.  We have held that "[w]here, as here, a 
reference to an ERISA plan can be excised without altering the 
legal effect of a statute in any way, we believe the reference 
should be regarded as without legal consequence for § 514(a) 
purposes."  United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192 n.6. 
 
 
was the statute in Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. at 
584, which required health coverage for injured employees on 
workers' compensation to be equivalent to regular employees' 
"existing health insurance coverage."  Such coverage was, in 
turn, "a welfare benefit plan under ERISA," so that injured 
employees' rights were premised on the existence of ERISA plans.  
Id.  Similarly, in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 
139-140 (1990), the Court held ERISA preempted a state cause of 
action in favor of an employee who alleged his employer 
terminated him to avoid contributing to his pension plan, where 
"the existence of a pension plan [was] a critical factor in 
establishing liability."  
 In United Wire we set out a test to distinguish between 
laws predicated on ERISA plans and laws that implicated such 
plans in a nonessential manner.  A New Jersey statute set 
hospital rates for all payors, and included a surcharge to 
compensate hospitals for their losses in providing care to 
Medicare patients.  While the dissent argued that New Jersey's 
system for funding underreimbursed care would not be viable 
without the participation of ERISA plans, United Wire, 995 F.2d 
at 1199-1200 (Nygaard, J., dissenting), we stated: 
 [I]t is of no legal consequence if removing 
ERISA plans from the scene would diminish the 
likelihood that the statute would meet its 
social goals.  Rather, the test for 
preemption in this regard is whether the 
existence of ERISA plans is necessary for the 




Id. at 1192 n.6.  Because the New Jersey law set standard rates 
and surcharges for all payors, we held it could be meaningfully 
applied in the absence of ERISA plans.  Id.   
 In the absence of ERISA plans, the Prevailing Wage Act 
could be meaningfully applied.  The Act requires the Secretary to 
measure prevailing benefits contributions in a locality for a 
given class of worker.  The Secretary would do so even if all of 
these were non-ERISA benefits -- that is, benefits "payable on a 
regular basis from the general assets of the employer,"  
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116 (1989), and that 
"create[] no need for an ongoing administrative program for 
processing claims and paying benefits,"  Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. 
at 12.  Similarly, the statute would be "meaningfully applied" in 
the absence of ERISA plans if a public works contractor satisfied 
the benefits component of a given prevailing wage by making 
contributions for non-ERISA benefits, or by paying the equivalent 
in cash.  Thus, no element of the Prevailing Wage Act is premised 
on the existence of an ERISA plan. 
  2.  Indirect relation 
 We next determine whether there is an indirect relation 
to ERISA plans requiring preemption.  "ERISA pre-empts any state 
law that refers to or has a connection with covered benefit plans 
(and that does not fall within a § 514(b) exception) `even if the 
law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or the 
effect is only indirect,' and even if the law is `consistent with 
ERISA's substantive requirements.'"  Greater Washington Bd. of 
Trade, 113 S. Ct. at 583 (citations omitted).  ERISA preempts 
 
 
laws that "dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans with 
regard to their benefits, structure, reporting and 
administration," or "impair the ability of a plan to function 
simultaneously in a number of states."  United Wire, 995 F.2d at 
1193.  Here, however, the only connections between ERISA plans 
and the Act are "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . to 
warrant a finding that the law `relates to' the plan."   Shaw, 
463 U.S. at 100, n. 21.   
 State laws are preempted because they dictate or 
restrict ERISA plans when, for example, they eliminate a method 
of calculating benefits in ERISA plans that is permitted by 
federal law, FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (state law 
prohibiting ERISA plans from requiring reimbursement of benefits 
from beneficiaries who recover in tort for the same expenses 
preempted by ERISA); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 
U.S. 504 (1981) (state law prohibiting offset of workers' 
compensation awards against retirement benefits preempted by 
ERISA).  A state cannot require an employer to contribute to 
certain ERISA plans, Local Union 598 v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 
846 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.) (state prevailing wage statute requiring 
contributions to apprenticeship program, an ERISA plan, 
preempted), aff'd 488 U.S. 881 (1988), or to provide certain 
benefits through an ERISA plan, Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 
F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hawaii law requiring comprehensive 
health benefits for all workers preempted), aff'd, 454 U.S. 801 
(1981).  One court has held that favoring one ERISA plan over 
another through financial incentives is barred.  National 
 
 
Elevator Industry, Inc., 957 F.2d at 1559 (Oklahoma prevailing 
wage law allowing reduced trainee wages only for participants in 
certain ERISA training programs preempted).   
  a.  Cash component 
 The primary restriction imposed by the Prevailing Wage 
Act is that employers on public contracts pay the predetermined 
prevailing minimum wage which, as we have described, has a cash 
component and a benefits component.  We will consider each 
component in turn.  The cash component fixes a minimum cash wage 
that must be paid, regardless of benefits contributions.  This 
does not dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans, directly 
or indirectly.  Employers must pay the cash minimum, regardless 
of what benefits they provide.   
 Appellees argue that the Prevailing Wage Act restricts 
their choice of plan benefits and structure because employers are 
not given credit for benefits contributions beyond the prevailing 
benefits minimum.  This, they say, makes it difficult for a 
single plan "to function simultaneously in a number of states."  
United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193.  Bell explains that it negotiates 
uniform contracts with its workers in several states that may 
award lower wages and higher benefits than those called for in 
the prevailing minimum wage for a particular public works 
project.  In this case, Bell says it would be forced to continue 
the benefits contributions it had agreed to in its national 
contract, but also raise its wages on the public works project.   
 Ironically, the Appellees here are objecting to an 
aspect of the Prevailing Wage Act that does not relate enough to 
 
 
employee benefits and benefit plans for their taste.  They would 
like the level of cash wages required to be tied to the level of 
benefits paid by an employer, but the state has chosen to fix the 
cash wage component independent of benefits contributions.  A 
state law does not dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans 
by having nothing to do with employee benefits.   
 The flaw in Appellees' objection is that it could be 
raised even against a prevailing hourly cash wage law with no 
benefits component.  Such a law would create the same 
"disincentive" against awarding benefits, because employers would 
have to pay the wage no matter what level of benefits they 
provided.  We do not believe ERISA preempts such basic state wage 
regulation.  "The States have traditionally regulated the payment 
of wages," and the Supreme Court has not found "any indication 
that Congress intended such far-reaching consequences" as the 
preemption of this sphere of state authority.  Massachusetts v. 
Morash, 490 U.S. at 119.  See also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b) (1993) 
("employee welfare benefit plan" does not include "[p]ayment by 
an employer of compensation on account of work performed by an 
employee.").  ERISA does not preempt cash wage requirements 
unrelated to employee benefits, nor does it require the state to 
encourage benefits contributions by reducing the minimum cash 
wage where an employer makes large benefits contributions.17 
                     
17.  Through the benefits component, the state has in fact 
extended employers the option of paying part of the minimum wage 
through cash or benefits.  As discussed below, we find this 
permissible under Shaw, 463 U.S. 85.  See infra at II(C)(2)(b).  
The state is, however, under no obligation to offer employers 
 
 
 Plainly, a minimum cash wage requirement will impose an 
additional cost on a Pennsylvania public works contractor which 
would otherwise pay less than the minimum, and this cost, like 
any other imposed on an employer, could influence its choices 
regarding ERISA benefits contributions.  But this could be said 
of any wage regulation.  For example, the Supreme Court upheld a 
Massachusetts statute that required employers to pay employees 
for all unused vacation time upon discharge, because the law was 
an instance of wage regulation and did not relate to employee 
benefit plans.  Morash, 490 U.S. 107.  And the Maine statute 
upheld in Fort Halifax required employers to give a severance 
payment of one week's salary for every year an employee had 
worked in the event of a plant closing.  482 U.S. at 3-4.  The 
severance payment represented "a one-time obligation . . . 
creat[ing] no need for an ongoing administrative program for 
processing claims and paying benefits," and hence did not relate 
to an ERISA plan.  Id. at 12.  Both laws constrained employers' 
choices regarding wages and non-ERISA benefits, and could 
indirectly affect their decisions as to what ERISA benefits to 
offer employees.  However, wage laws are among the "many forms of 
state regulation under the police power which result in increases 
in the cost of doing business," United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1196, 
and this incidental effect does not create a preemptible relation 
(..continued) 
this choice, and may require all or, as here, part of a minimum 
wage to be paid in cash. 
 
 
to ERISA plans.18  ERISA's preemption clause aims "to ensure 
                     
18.  While state regulations may affect the cost of doing 
business in a state, they may not, consistent with ERISA, place 
administrative burdens and costs on ERISA plans that make it 
impractical for an employer to provide a nationwide plan.  Thus, 
the Fort Halifax Court stated, "Faced with the difficulty or 
impossibility of structuring administrative practices according 
to a set of uniform guidelines, an employer may decide to reduce 
benefits or simply not to pay them at all.").  482 U.S. at 13.  
Similarly, the Holliday Court stated, "To require plan providers 
to design their programs in an environment of differing state 
regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide 
plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with 
decreased benefits."  498 U.S. at 60. 
 State regulation may also be preempted for imposing 
costs directly on core functions of ERISA plans.  For example, in 
E-Systems, Inc. v. Pogue, 929 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 585 (1991), the court held ERISA preempted a 
state tax on fees for services to ERISA plans and benefits paid 
by ERISA plans.  The Second Circuit went farther in Travelers 
Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993) (criticizing 
Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 
U.S. 1008 (1985)), where it overturned a New York law that added 
various surcharges to hospital bills of patients covered by 
commercial insurance carriers and health maintenance 
organizations.  Because the surcharges imposed "a significant 
economic burden on commercial insurers and HMOs," the court found 
they had "an impermissible impact on ERISA plan structure and 
administration."  Id. at 721.   
 It is not clear whether Travelers Ins. directly 
conflicts with United Wire.  See Travelers Ins., 14 F.3d at 721 
n.3 (arguing United Wire interprets preemption clause too 
narrowly).  Unlike the statute in Travelers Ins., the New Jersey 
law in United Wire imposed a surcharge on all payors, not just 
commercial insurers and HMOs, and gave discounts only for 
"quantifiable economic benefits rendered to the institution or to 
the health care delivery system taken as a whole."  United Wire, 
995 F.2d at 1189 (citation omitted).  Thus, the law might more 
legitimately be regarded as one of general application rather 
than one specifically affecting ERISA plans; it may also have had 
a less significant economic effect on such plans.  As we stated 
in United Wire, general legislation under a state's police power 
may raise the cost of doing business for ERISA plans without 
triggering preemption.  But in any event, the Prevailing Wage Act 
has a far less direct economic impact on ERISA plans than either 
of the hospital rate laws:  because in essence the Act imposes 
only a wage requirement, it changes employers' wage costs, not 
ERISA plan costs. 
 
 
benefit plans will be governed by only a single set of 
regulations,"  FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990), not 
to bestow on employers a uniform regulatory and economic 
environment for all their activities across the country.  Because 
states enact their own wage and non-ERISA benefits regulations, 
Morash, 490 U.S. 107; Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. 1; Shaw 463 U.S. 85, 
collection laws, Mackey, 486 U.S. 825, and controls on hospital 
charges, United Wire, 995 F.2d 1179, employers must adjust their 
operations according to locale.  This administrative and 
financial burden arises from the "patchwork scheme" of our 
federal system, a system whose "separate spheres of governmental 
authority," Alessi, 451 U.S. at 522, were not preempted by ERISA. 
  b.  Benefits component 
 Unlike the cash component, the benefits component of 
the prevailing minimum wage plainly has some connection to 
employee benefits, and thus to benefits plans, but we find no 
grounds for preemption here, either.  Contracts for public works 
must either provide benefits contributions at the level 
determined in the prevailing wage or the monetary equivalent 
thereof.  34 Pa. Code § 9.106.  Appellees suggest this provision 
creates a preemptible relation to ERISA plans merely by providing 
the option of complying with part of the minimum wage through 
benefits contributions.  We disagree.  The provision does not 
require or encourage an employer to provide certain benefits, to 
alter the manner in which it provides benefits, or even to 
provide any benefits at all.  The benefits component only relates 
to ERISA plans when an employer decides to satisfy it through 
 
 
contributions to ERISA plans instead of cash payments or 
contributions to non-ERISA benefits.  Where a legal requirement 
may be easily satisfied through means unconnected to ERISA plans, 
and only relates to ERISA plans at the election of an employer, 
it "affect[s] employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law `relates 
to' the plan."  Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21. 
 We are guided by Shaw, where the Court held ERISA did 
not preempt a New York law requiring employers to pay sick-leave 
benefits to employees unable to work because of pregnancy.  
Section 4(b)(3) of ERISA exempts from the statute any plan 
"maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable . 
. . disability insurance laws," 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3); such 
plans may therefore be regulated by the state.  The Court held § 
4(b)(3) only saved from preemption plans solely devoted to 
disability benefits and did not exempt a plan that included 
provisions for benefits subject to ERISA along with provisions 
intended to comply with state disability laws.  Id. at 106-07.  
However, the Court held that because § 4(b)(3) allowed New York 
to require employers to provide certain benefits in a non-ERISA 
plan -- one solely devoted to disability benefits -- it could 
also offer them the option of providing those benefits along with 
non-disability benefits in an ERISA plan.  Thus, 
 while the State may not require an employer 
to alter its ERISA plan, it may force the 
employer to choose between providing 
disability benefits in a separately 
administered plan and including the state-
mandated benefits in its ERISA plan.  If the 
State is not satisfied that the ERISA plan 
 
 
comports with the requirements of its 
disability insurance law, it may compel the 
employer to maintain a separate plan that 
does comply. 
 
Id. at 108.  The benefits component of the prevailing minimum 
wage extends to employers a similar choice.  A state requirement 
that an employer pay a minimum cash wage does not relate to ERISA 
plans.  The benefits component represents a sum of money an 
employer may pay either through cash wages or through benefits 
contributions, some of which may be toward ERISA plans.  To 
paraphrase Shaw, if the state is not satisfied that the amount of 
benefits contributions satisfies the total wage requirement, it 
compels the employer to pay greater cash wages. 
 Thus, when Appellees complain the Prevailing Wage Act 
impermissibly subjects their ERISA plans to different regulations 
in Pennsylvania than elsewhere, they are speaking of a law 
requiring only that when their benefits contributions fall short 
of the prevailing minimum, they may make up the difference with 
cash.19  Like the New York law in Shaw, the Prevailing Wage Act 
is not preempted, because an employer may comply without making 
any adjustment in its ERISA plans.  Unless the employer chooses 
otherwise, the benefits component imposes a cash wage 
requirement, and it is of no consequence that this requirement is 
particular to Pennsylvania public works projects -- as discussed 
above, ERISA does not preempt a state's power to set a minimum 
cash wage.  See supra at II(C)(2)(a). 
                     
19.  They also admit they could simply decline to participate in 
public works contracts. 
 
 
  Some of Appellees' objections are levelled at the line-
item approach to the Prevailing Wage Act, which was in effect for 
all benefits before the Declaratory Order was issued, and 
continued for non-ERISA benefits thereafter.  We acknowledge this 
would be a different case if the Act required line-item 
specification in the benefits component.20  We believe a state 
can set a minimum cash wage, and allow an employer the option of 
paying part of that in benefits.  We doubt, however, a state 
could also specify that only particular benefits could be given 
in lieu of cash payments without relating to ERISA plans, since 
that would favor certain benefits plans over others.21  Line-item 
specification would effectively create a cash incentive to award 
the predetermined benefits and not others, and to award certain 
amounts of those benefits and no more.  As the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit said: 
  We accept, as a general proposition, the 
state's right to regulate wages.  But a wage 
law that provides an option favoring certain 
ERISA plans and benefits . . . over other 
ERISA plans and benefits . . . is not a law 
of "general application" and may be used to 
effect change in the administration, 
structure and benefits of an ERISA plan. 
 
                     
20.  See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
21.  For example, a predetermination for Common Heavy & Highway 
Laborers reproduced in the joint appendix gives hourly prevailing 
minimums for health and welfare benefits, pension benefits, and 
education, but nothing for the other eight categories, such as 
apprenticeship and training, vacation, or legal services.  Under 
the line-item approach, the contractor hiring a Common Highway 
Laborer would get a wage offset by paying him up to $2.62 an hour 
in health benefits, but no offset for health benefits beyond 
that, and no offset for payments for apprenticeship and training.   
 
 
National Elevator Indus., 957 F.2d at 1561 (holding ERISA 
preempted an Oklahoma law that reduced the minimum wage for 
employees only in a specified apprenticeship program, which was 
an ERISA plan).  Pursuant to its power to set minimum level of 
remuneration to workers, a state may allow part of a minimum wage 
to be satisfied by benefits contributions.  But the state asserts 
an additional power, the power to determine what benefits workers 
should receive, when it gives preferred status to some benefits 
over others in a minimum wage scheme.  This power is not left to 
the states under ERISA.22 
  c.  Administration 
 Finally, we must consider whether the Prevailing Wage 
Act and the accompanying regulations "dictate or restrict the 
choices of ERISA plans with regard to their . . . reporting and 
administration."  United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193.  Administrative 
simplicity is one of the purposes of ERISA, and "Congress 
                     
22.  Other courts have found states may not favor one benefits 
plan, or one type of benefits plan, over another.  In General 
Electric Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 891 F.2d 25 (2d 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990), the court ruled 
ERISA preempted New York's prevailing wage law, which required 
benefits contributions in particular categories and amounts or 
their cash equivalents.  The court found the law objectionable 
for a number of reasons, including the fact that the law 
effectively prescribed "the type and amount of an employer's 
contributions to a plan," and "the nature and amount of benefits 
thereunder."  Id., 891 F.2d at 29.  (The General Electric court 
also objected to the administrative burden imposed on employers 
by the New York law.  Id.  It is not clear whether the court 
would have found the law acceptable if line-item compliance in 
the benefits package had not been required.)  See also Local 
Union 598 v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.), 
aff'd 488 U.S. 881 (1988) (discussed supra at 29). 
 
 
intended pre-emption to afford employers the advantages of a 
uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a single set 
of regulations."  Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 11.  But state laws 
are not necessarily preempted because they impose some 
administrative burden on ERISA plans.  The Mackey Court was not 
moved by petitioners' argument that subjecting ERISA plans to 
state law garnishment by creditors of plan participants would 
also create "substantial administrative burdens and costs" when 
"plan trustees are served with a garnishment summons, become 
parties to a suit, and must respond and deposit the demanded 
funds due the beneficiary-debtor."  Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831.  We 
think preemption is not required where a state law places 
administrative requirements on ERISA plans so slight that the law 
"creates no impediment to an employer's adoption of a uniform 
benefit administration scheme."  Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 14.  
See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2d 
Cir.) ("What triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect 
effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the 
primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as 
determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the 
amount of that benefit."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989).  
 Here, the bulk of administrative burdens placed on 
employers by the Prevailing Wage Act do not relate to ERISA plans 
at all.  The law requires that each contractor and subcontractor 
"shall keep an accurate record showing the name, craft and the 
actual hourly rate of wage paid to each workman employed by him 
in connection with public work," that the record be preserved for 
 
 
two years from the date of payment, and that it be open for 
inspection.  43 P.S.A. § 165-6.  The regulations expand on this, 
requiring recording of personal information regarding the worker, 
specification of the hours worked each day, and the preservation 
of time cards and indentures and approvals regarding 
apprenticeships.  34 Pa. Code § 9.109.  None of these records 
relates to employee benefit plans; rather, they are general 
employment data a state would require even if it were merely 
regulating cash wages.   
 Two minor administrative requirements are placed on 
ERISA plans.  Under current implementation of the Act, the state 
must certify benefits as bona fide for them to count against the 
prevailing minimum benefits contribution.  This apparently 
requires simply that the contributions actually be made to fringe 
benefit programs and be held for or attributed to the exclusive 
benefit of employees.  See Bitzel Declaration, Bell App. at 393.  
The other requirement is that employers keep a record of their 
benefits contributions, and certify weekly to the officer 
disbursing public funds that they have paid wages in conformity 
with the contract, or indicate what wages remain unpaid.23  34 
P.S.A. §§ 9.109, 9.110.  We do not agree with amicus Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States that this entails complex, on-going 
measurements for each employee.  Brief for Chamber of Commerce at 
16-17.  The memo from Field Inspection Supervisor Risaliti 
                     
23.  Presumably, "wages in strict conformity with the contract," 
34 P.S.A. § 9.110(a), include contributions for benefits.   
 
 
indicates the Secretary approved a simple method for estimating 
hourly benefits contributions where premiums are paid monthly:  
the premium is divided by 160.  Keystone App. at 80.  We presume 
simple formulae are available for calculating the hourly and 
weekly value of benefits paid in other ways as well.   
 These records and reporting requirements entail only a 
slight burden.  Calculating benefits paid out will not influence 
"decisions regarding the internal design and structure of benefit 
plans (e.g. who may collect, and how, and from whom)," United 
Wire, 995 F.2d at 1194 n.8, so the ease and efficiency of 
administering nationwide benefits plans will not be impeded.   
See also Minnesota Chapter, Assoc'd Builders v. Minnesota Dep't 
of Labor and Industry, Civ. No. 4-92-564, slip op. at 7, (D. 
Minn. April 27 1993) (Under Minnesota prevailing wage law, "[t]he 
requirement of calculating [the cost of benefits] falls on the 
employer itself, but does not place any administrative burden on 
the plan.  The requirement of calculating costs and keeping 
records may somewhat increase the cost of the benefits plans, but 
this incidental impact on the plan need not lead to 
preemption.").  We see no potential that the ability of plans to 
operate in several states will be impaired by the administrative 
requirements of the Prevailing Wage Act. 
  d.  Conclusion 
 We acknowledge that at some point, the quantity of a 
law's indirect effects on ERISA plans may require preemption.  
For example, as we have explained, under a line-item approach the 
Prevailing Wage Act would create incentives favoring some types 
 
 
of benefits over others, even though it would still allow 
employers to substitute cash for benefits, and this would appear 
to exceed the state's authority under ERISA.  A significant, 
though indirect, economic effect on ERISA plans could also be 
grounds for preemption -- for example, though a state may set a 
minimum cash wage, if that minimum were so high that employers 
could not practically provide any benefits, the law might well be 
found to restrict the choices of ERISA plans.  As we interpret 
the Prevailing Wage Act, however, it neither encourages nor 
constrains any particular kind of conduct towards ERISA plans, 
nor does it cross the line from wage regulation to benefit 
regulation -- rather, while imposing a cost on employers, as any 
wage regulation will, the Act leaves employers free to structure 
benefit plans as they wish. 
  Furthermore, the Act and regulations represent 
reasonable exercises of a state's traditional power to regulate 
wages.  ERISA, and particularly the preemption clause, were 
designed to ensure fairness and consistency in employee benefit 
plans.  We see no indication, however, that in enacting ERISA, 
Congress expected it would require uniformity of wage regulation 
among the states or that its preemption provision would 
eviscerate state power to regulate wages. 
 III. 
 The Prevailing Wage Act and its accompanying 
regulations do not relate to employee benefit plans in more than 
a tenuous, remote, and peripheral manner.  They do not refer to 
ERISA plans.  Rather, they establish a system of wage regulation 
 
 
that neither burdens nor influences the benefits or structure of 
employee benefit plans, nor does it interfere with the uniform 
administration of such plans.  "If a State creates no prospect of 
conflict with a federal statute, there is no warrant for 
disabling it from attempting to address uniquely local social and 
economic problems."  Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 19.   
 For these reasons, we will reverse the district court's 
judgment to the extent it held the Prevailing Wage Act and 
regulations preempted.  Because the Declaratory Order singles out 
ERISA plans for special treatment, however, we will affirm the 
judgment of the district court that ERISA preempts the 
Declaratory Order. 
 
 
 
